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CIGNA V. AMARA: SUPREME COURT RESOLVES 
SEVERAL ERISA CLAIM ISSUES WHILE LEAVING 
OTHERS FOR THE LOWER COURTS* 
MICHAEL A. VALENZA** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 On May 16, 2011, the United States Supreme Court, in an 8-0 opinion 
authored by Justice Breyer,1 addressed an issue that the Court refused to consider 
some seven years earlier.2  The decision rendered on May 16 in CIGNA Corp. v. 
Amara involved, at least preliminarily, consideration of whether a Summary Plan 
Description or other employer-generated documents or communications may under 
certain circumstances override conflicting terms in a Plan Document governed by 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).3  The decision also 
addressed the correct legal standard applicable to a plan participant’s claims of an 
employer’s ERISA violations and what equitable remedies might be available to 
successful plaintiffs under ERISA Section 502(a)(3).4   
 In the weeks immediately following publication of the CIGNA opinion, 
numerous interpretations and comments were offered by, among others, 
                                                 
* This article was written following the United States Supreme Court’s Decision in CIGNA Corp. v. 
Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011), and in response to a previous article by the author concerning ERISA 
Plan Documents, Michael A. Valenza, Accuracy is Not a Lot to Ask: Decisions in the Second and Third 
Circuits Set the Tone for Litigation Over Conflicts Between ERISA Plan Documents and Summaries, 6 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 361 (2005). 
** Assistant Professor, Temple University, Fox School of Business. 
1 CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).  Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion in which 
Justice Thomas joined.  Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision.  Id. 
2 See generally Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1105 
(2004). 
3 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876-78. 
4 Id. at 1878-83. 
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organizations whose members may be affected by the Court’s ruling.5  Interestingly, 
it seems that the commentators, regardless of their specific employer- or employee-
related interests, all find something favorable to those interests in the Court’s lengthy 
and multi-faceted ruling.6  Whether the various interpretations are justified, they 
suggest that perhaps the Court’s ruling may not be the final note on the issues it 
decided in this case.  
Before addressing the facts specific to CIGNA Corporation’s ERISA-
governed plan, a brief historical perspective may clarify ERISA’s purpose and assist 
in understanding the kinds of factual circumstances under which conflicts have 
arisen in the past and may arise in the future.7  Since the enactment of ERISA in 
1974,8 the common law surrounding its disclosure requirements has both clarified 
and, in some cases, complicated the distribution of rights and obligations under the 
Act.9  Courts have recognized that appropriate plan disclosure is an essential element 
of the statute and have upheld suits brought by plan participants and beneficiaries 
aimed at enforcing the disclosed terms of benefit plans.10  The circuit courts are 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Arthur D. Postal, Supreme Court Favors CIGNA in Summary Plan Description Case, 
LIFEHEALTHPRO (May 16, 2011), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/05/16/supreme-court-
favors-cigna-in-summary-plan-descrip; Supreme Court Decision in Amara v. CIGNA a Victory for Workers 
and Retirees, PENSION RIGHTS CENTER (May 16, 2011),  http://www.pensionrights.org/newsroom/ 
releases/supreme-court-decision-amara-v-cigna-victory-workers-and-retirees. 
6 See sources cited supra note 5. 
7 See generally Charles R. Peterson, ERISA Does Not Give Employers a Free Pass: Refusing to Place the Burden 
of Careless Drafting on the Employee, 9 NEV. L.J. 704 (2009) (addressing the reliance standard in ERISA 
plan and summary conflicts); Michael A. Valenza, Accuracy Is Not a Lot to Ask: Decisions in the Second and 
Third Circuits Set the Tone for Litigation over Conflicts Between ERISA Plan Documents and Summaries, 6 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 361 (2005) (addressing cases arising from conflicting ERISA plan and summary 
disputes). 
8 See generally Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code, including 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1001-1461 and 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 and 4972-4975). 
9 See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (explaining that “courts are 
to develop a ‘federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.’” (quoting 
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).  See generally Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). 
10 See Jensen v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945, 952 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Adequate disclosure to employees is 
one of ERISA’s major purposes.”); see also Layaou v. Xerox Corp., 238 F.3d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 2001) 
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unified in ruling that terms of the Summary Plan Description (“SPD”), an overview 
document that describes plan benefits and obligations in lay terms,11 override 
conflicting terms in the Plan Document (“Plan”), the more complex and 
comprehensive document typically written in professional jargon.12   
Employees who participate in ERISA-sponsored welfare or pension plans 
usually receive a copy of the SPD and not the lengthy Plan itself.13  Courts have 
recognized that because employees may only have these summaries to consult before 
making important decisions regarding employment, health care, and retirement,14 the 
summaries should be written accurately, distributed promptly, and made binding not 
only on the plan participant, but also on the Plan and its administrators.15  However, 
the same courts disagree about what elements are necessary to succeed on a claim for 
benefits denied or otherwise withheld.16  Thus, the circuit in which a claim is brought 
determines whether a plaintiff must show some form of reliance, detriment, or a 
                                                                                                                                     
(“[E]mployees are entitled to rely on the SPDs as their primary source of information about their 
benefits.”). 
11 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) mandates that the summary plan description “shall be written in a manner 
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and 
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations 
under the plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006).  Section 1022(b) delineates the specific items that must 
be addressed in the SPD, the most important of which for the topic at hand are “circumstances which 
may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits.”  Id. § 1022(b). Corresponding 
federal regulations provide a more detailed list of items required in an SPD, and specify the manner in 
which they are to be presented.  29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.102-2, 2520.102-3 (2010). 
12 Valenza, supra note 7, at 367-75. 
13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (2006) (“The administrator of each employee benefit plan shall cause to be 
furnished in accordance with section 1024(b) of this title to each participant covered under the plan 
and to each beneficiary who is receiving benefits under the plan:  (1) a summary plan description 
described in section 1022(a)(1) of this title.”). 
14 See Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. Research Found., 334 
F.3d 365, 379 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The SPD is the document to which the lay employee is likely to refer in 
obtaining information about the plan and in making decisions affected by the terms of the plan.”); see 
also Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050, 1051 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Nothing in 
ERISA requires that the insurance policy summarized in the summary plan document be given the 
insured.”). 
15 See Burstein, 334 F.3d at 378. 
16 Id. at 380 (the plan participant need not plead reliance on the SPD).  But see Senkier, 948 F.2d at 1051 
(the participant must rely on the SPD). 
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combination of the two as a result of a conflict between an SPD provision and the 
Plan language. 
While the circuit courts that have addressed this question have crafted their 
decisions when Plans have been contradicted by SPDs,17 document conflicts where 
the documents in question are other than the SPDs have not been decided.  Thus, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA does appear to be making new law on that 
issue; that is, an SPD may consist of more than a single summary plan description.18  
The Supreme Court, however, did so much more than recognize the relevance of 
employer or plan documents and communications other than “Plans” and “SPDs.”  
Its decision in CIGNA clarified the legal standard applicable to claims brought by 
employees and other beneficiaries, and, in so doing, it essentially reversed multiple 
prior circuit court rulings.19  Its decision also effectively restricted litigation based 
upon one of ERISA’s remedy sections, while simultaneously opening up another 
section to ERISA plaintiffs.20 
 In analyzing the CIGNA decision, it is useful to examine the legislature’s 
purpose in enacting ERISA.  Congress declared that one of its goals in enacting 
ERISA was: 
 [T]o protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting 
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information 
with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, 
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit 
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and 
ready access to the Federal courts.21   
 While Congress was expansive in explaining the purpose and function of the 
ERISA legislation,22 it was peculiarly reticent to prescribe a clear roadmap to be 
followed by the courts when those plan participants, employees, and beneficiaries 
                                                 
17 Valenza, supra note 7, at 367-76. 
18 See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1877 (2011). 
19 Id. at 1880-82. 
20 Id. at 1878-80. 
21 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006). 
22 Id. 
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were the apparent victims of ERISA violations. One might reasonably assume that 
the Congress was indeed allowing the courts to create a federal common law for 
such matters.  While the Supreme Court’s opinion in CIGNA would on its face 
appear to follow this Congressional declaration, the seemingly incongruously 
favorable remarks coming from opposite elements of ERISA-governed parties 
suggest that the import of the Court’s decision upon the lower courts is yet to be 
seen.  Whether CIGNA will encourage more litigation rather than result in less is 
likewise an unknown. 
II. CIGNA CORPORATION’S ERISA VIOLATIONS: FACTUAL BASIS AND 
LOWER COURT RULING 
Because the Court was very clear in stating that its “decision rest[ed] in 
important part upon the circumstances present,”23 the facts surrounding this class 
action lawsuit must be explicitly described and understood.  Prior to 1998, CIGNA 
Corporation (“CIGNA”) had an ERISA-governed pension plan that provided a 
defined benefit for its retiring employees in the form of an annuity calculated on the 
basis of pre-retirement salary and length of service.24  In November 1997, CIGNA 
announced via a newsletter that the pension plan would terminate on December 31, 
1997 and that a new plan would go into effect on January 1, 1998, although the 
details of the new plan would not be explained to the employees until later in 1998.25  
Almost a year later, CIGNA supplied the plan details,26 which showed that the new 
plan, contrary to the statements made in the newsletter, had the potential to reduce 
individual benefits.27  CIGNA also failed to explain to employees the potential for 
“wear away,” a phenomenon whereby a drop in interest rates would reduce 
individual account values and would require additional years of contributions to 
make up the loss.28  In response to these inconsistencies, Janice Amara and the 
                                                 
23 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1871. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 73.  The newsletter provided (1) that full benefits earned as of December 31, 1997 would be 
deposited to the newly created individual employee accounts, (2) that retirement benefits would be the 
same or improved, and (3) that CIGNA would not see a cost saving.  See id. at 1872-73. 
28 Id. at 1874. 
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several other named plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of some 25,000 current and 
retired employees of CIGNA, instituted a class action lawsuit against the 
corporation.29  The plaintiffs claimed that CIGNA violated several of its ERISA 
obligations with respect to changes it made to its retirement plan.30 
Because CIGNA did not provide thorough, or even less than thorough, 
explanations of these aspects of the new plan and the risks to the employees, the 
district court found not only that the plan descriptions “were incomplete and 
inaccurate,” but also that “CIGNA intentionally misled its employees.”31  The district 
court concluded, as a matter of law, that CIGNA violated ERISA Sections 204(h), 
102(a) and 104(b) as they existed in 1997-98.32  Section 204(h) “forbade an 
amendment of a pension plan that would ‘provide for a significant reduction in the 
rate of future benefit accrual’ unless the plan administrator also sent a ‘written notice’ 
that provided either the text of the amendment or summarized its likely effects.”33  
CIGNA had not supplied its employees with such a timely written notice.34  Sections 
102(a) and 104(b), “require a plan administrator to provide beneficiaries with 
summary plan descriptions and with summaries of material modifications, ‘written in 
a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant,’ that are 
‘sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and 
beneficiaries of their rights and obligations.’”35  CIGNA again failed to provide its 
employees with the requisite summary materials.36 
 Having found, as a matter of law, that CIGNA violated its ERISA-mandated 
obligations, the district court proceeded to consider the remedies available to fashion 
the proper relief.37  Justice Breyer related the district court’s five holdings regarding 
relief afforded to  the plaintiff class members: “(1) that the evidence presented [at 
                                                 
29 Id. at 1870. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1874.    
32 Id. at 1874-75. 
33 Id. at 1874. (citations omitted). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 1874-75 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022(a), 1024(b) (2006 ed. and Supp. III)). 
36 Id. at 1874. 
37 Id. at 1875. 
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trial] had raised a presumption of ‘likely harm’ suffered by the members of the 
relevant employee class, and . . . that CIGNA, though free to offer contrary evidence 
in respect to some or all of those employees, had failed to rebut that 
presumption[;]”38 (2) “that the notices in respect to the freezing of old-plan benefits, 
effective December 31, 1997, were valid[;]”39 (3) “the terms of the new plan’s 
guarantee” would be reformed so as to provide employees with both a guaranteed 
annuity and new plan benefits;40 (4) that all class members would receive the 
guaranteed annuity plus new-plan benefits;41 and (5) that ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) 
authorized the foregoing elements of relief.42  
 The plaintiffs and CIGNA cross-appealed the district court’s judgment to the 
Second Circuit.43  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a brief opinion, 
affirmed the district court’s ruling, commending the district court’s “well-reasoned 
and scholarly opinions.”44 The parties filed cross-petitions for writs of certiorari to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.45  The Court granted CIGNA’s petition “to consider 
whether a showing of ‘likely harm’ is sufficient to entitle plan participants to recover 
benefits based on faulty disclosures.”46  The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari 
certainly indicated that it would decide the applicable legal standard in determining 
prejudice, which was the issue decided by the Second Circuit’s 2003 decision in Burke 
                                                 
38 Id.   
39 Id. The district court had distinguished the notice of the freezing of old-plan benefits, which was 
valid, from the new-plan notice, which was invalid.  Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.    
42 Id.  Since the district court held that it was authorized by section 502(a)(1)(B) to provide the relief it 
had fashioned, that court did not reach the question of whether it was also authorized to provide 
relief pursuant to section 502(a)(3). The district court assumed relief would not have been available as 
compensatory damages under section 502(a)(3) and further that section 502(a)(3) relief would not be 
possible where a remedy had been found under section 502(a)(1)(B).  Amara v. CIGNA Corp. 559 F. 
Supp. 2d 192, 205 (D. Conn. 2008) (citing Wilkins v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund, 445 
F.3d 572, 578 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
43 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876. 
44 Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 348 F. App’x. 627 (2d Cir. 2009). 
45 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876. 
46 Id. 
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v. Kodak Retirement Income Plan.47  Of course, the Supreme Court’s opinion did much 
more than effectively reverse Burke and the other circuit courts on the requisite legal 
standard.48 
The entry of the U.S. Supreme Court at this juncture, in light of its prior 
reticence to decide this and related questions, suggests at the very least that the 
Supreme Court did not earlier feel compelled to resolve what became a split among 
the circuits on the issue of conflicts between plan documents and SPDs.  In fact, as 
will be seen with the Second Circuit’s decision in Burke—from which the Supreme 
Court refused to hear an appeal—by the time Burke was decided by the Second 
Circuit in 2003 and the Supreme Court allowed that decision to stand (in 2004), it 
appeared that the Supreme Court had more than intimated its position.49  However, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA may suggest not so much a change in 
position as a recognition of the need to correct the lower courts’ inaccurate 
assessments of the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions.  The following circuit court 
opinions on the question of conflicts between plan documents and SPDs, along with 
the issue of whether proof of reliance and prejudice (whether actual or likely) are 
requisite elements of successful ERISA claims, set the stage for the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in CIGNA.     
III. ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICABLE STANDARD, WHETHER LIKELY 
PREJUDICE/HARMLESS ERROR, RELIANCE, OR ACTUAL HARM, AS THE 
REQUIREMENT FOR RELIEF 
A. Prior Circuit Court Decisions 
One of the earliest of the circuit court cases was Govoni v. Bricklayers, Masons 
and Plasterers International Union,50 in which the First Circuit held that, while the SPD 
did not accurately reflect the Plan, plaintiff Govoni was not entitled to relief because 
he was unable to “show some significant reliance upon, or possible prejudice flowing 
from, the faulty plan description.”51  Govoni had been a member of the union from 
                                                 
47 Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1105 
(2004). 
48 See generally CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).  
49 See generally Burke, 336 F.3d 103. 
50 732 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1984). 
51 Id. at 252. 
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1951 until his retirement in 1979, with a break in service between 1962 and 1966.52  
The union amended its pension rules in 1976 (in response to the then newly enacted 
ERISA), and its new pension rules would have given Govoni credit for the break 
years that would not have figured into Govoni’s pension credits under the older 
rules.53  The First Circuit concluded that Govoni could not have relied upon, and 
could not be prejudiced by, a rule change that had not yet been made.54 
 Additional First Circuit decisions held firmly to the requirement of reliance 
or prejudice.  In Bachelder v. Communications Satellite Corp.,55 the court ruled that an 
SPD provision regarding a cash payment option for employee-owned stock was 
ambiguous, but there could be no recovery by the employees who “did not show 
significant reliance or even the possibility of prejudice flowing from the SPD.”56   
Several years later, the First Circuit decided Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan for 
salaried Employees., a case in which the plaintiff-employee, again, had made several 
financial decisions arguably in expectation of receiving a certain level of pension 
benefits.57  The plaintiff in Mauser argued in the district court that he purchased a 
vacation home and expended funds on his daughter’s wedding with the expectation 
of receiving certain pension benefits.58  On appeal, the circuit court ruled that Mauser 
had not relied on the SPD to such an extent that it created a “measurable prejudice” 
and that “the mere forming of an expectation as to benefits is not enough.”59 
The Fourth,60 Seventh,61 Eighth,62 Tenth,63 and Eleventh64 Circuits adopted 
the Govoni rule requiring either reliance or prejudice.  However, the Second,65 Third,66 
                                                 
52 Id. at 251. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 252-53. 
55 837 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1988). 
56 Id. at 522-23 (citing Govoni, 732 F.2d at 252). 
57 See Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 239 F.3d 51, 53-54 (1st Cir. 
2001). 
58 Id. at 53. 
59 Id. at 56 (citing Bachelder, 837 F.2d at 523 n.6). 
60 See Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 141 (4th Cir. 1993). 
61 See Health Cost Controls, Inc. v. Washington, 187 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (in which the court 
clarified its position on a plan-summary description conflict by stating that the plan governs unless the 
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and Fifth67 Circuits rejected the rule, and the Sixth68 and Ninth69 Circuits did not 
clearly decide the issue.  The CIGNA plaintiffs pointed to this latter group in their 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the more modern analysis of the 
Plan-SPD conflict issue of the Burke (Second Circuit) and Burstein (Third Circuit) 
courts should be favored.70  After all, it was the Burke decision that the Supreme 
Court chose not to accept for appeal some years earlier.71   
 The Burstein decision was more employee-favorable than the Burke decision.  
In Burnstein, the district court had ruled that benefits could not possibly be recovered 
from a Plan based upon benefits supposedly granted pursuant to the related SPD or 
                                                                                                                                     
employee or beneficiary has reasonably relied on the summary plan description to his detriment, 
indicating that both reliance and prejudice are required). 
62 See Maxa v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing with approval Monson 
v. Century Mfg. Co., 739 F.2d 1293, 1302 (8th Cir. 1984) (“’[E]vidence of detrimental reliance must 
show that the plaintiff [ ] took action, resulting in some detriment, that [he] would not have taken had 
[he] known [that the terms of the plan were otherwise],’ or that he failed, to his detriment, to take 
action that he would have taken had he known that the terms of the plan were otherwise.”) (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted)). 
63 See Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996) (in which the court addressed not 
only issues of whether the employees were vested at the time the plan administrator changed the 
terms of the plan and whether a reservation of rights would be valid, but also that the employees 
could only secure relief if they had relied upon a faulty SPD or had shown prejudice arising from the 
inconsistency between the SPD and the Plan). 
64 See Branch v. G. Bernd Co., 955 F.2d 1574, 1579 (11th Cir. 1992). 
65 See Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1105 
(2004). 
66 See Burstein v. Ret. Account Plan for Employees of Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found., 
334 F.3d 365, 380 (3d Cir. 2003). 
67 See Rhorer v. Raytheon Eng’rs. & Constructors, Inc., 181 F.3d 634, 644 n.12 (5th Cir. 1999). 
68 See, e.g., Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1996). 
69 See generally Bergt v. Ret. Plan for Pilots Employed by MarkAir, Inc., 293 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2002). 
70 See CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1881-82 (2011); see also Burnstein, 334 F.3d at 376-78 
(discussing conflict between terms of the SPD and terms of the Plan Document); Burke, 336 F.3d at 
110 (“Where the terms of a plan and the SPD conflict, the SPD controls.”). 
71 See Kodak Ret. Income Plan v. Burke, 540 U.S. 1105 (2004). 
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other secondary documents.72  The Third Circuit, in reversing the district court, 
stated, “Today, we join with the other Courts of Appeals that have considered this 
issue, and hold that, where a summary plan description conflicts with the plan 
language, it is the summary plan description that will control.”73  Furthermore, a 
claimant seeking plan benefits need not plead nor prove reliance upon the SPD,74 or 
upon such other secondary document as may have contained the conflicting benefit 
information (as the Third Circuit did not restrict its holding to SPDs alone).75  The 
“other Courts of Appeals” to which the Burstein court referred were those of the 
Fourth,76 Fifth,77 Ninth,78 and Eleventh Circuits.79 
 Compared to the Burstein court, the Burke court was somewhat less generous 
to employees and plan beneficiaries.  While the Second Circuit apparently agreed 
with the district court’s finding that reliance was not an essential element of proof 
and recovery, the Second Circuit ruled that recovery would require prejudice, but 
that a contradictory SPD creates prejudice as a matter of law.80  The court provided 
additional context to its prejudice requirement: “Cognizant of ERISA’s distribution 
of benefits, we require, for a showing of prejudice, that a plan participant or 
beneficiary was likely to have been harmed as a result of a deficient SPD.”81  The 
Second Circuit further expanded on its ruling by at least indirectly pointing to the 
need for some injury or damage to the plaintiff before a recovery can be awarded, 
                                                 
72 See Burstein., 334 F.3d at 373-74. 
73 Id. at 378.  See generally  Barker v. Ceridian Corp., 122 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 1997); Chiles v. Ceridian 
Corp., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Pierce v. Sec. Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1992); Senkier v. Hartford Life & Accident 
Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1991); Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1991); 
Heidgerd v. Olin Corp., 906 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1990); Edwards v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 851 
F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1988); McKnight v. S. Life & Health Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1985). 
74 Burnstein, 334 F.3d at 380. 
75 Id. 
76 See Aiken v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1993). 
77 Hansen v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 940 F.2d 971, 981-82 (5th Cir, 1991). 
78 Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1321. 
79 Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1515 (10th Cir. 1996). 
80 Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2003). 
81 Id. at 113 (emphasis in original). 
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stating that “the employer may rebut [the likelihood of prejudice] through evidence 
that the deficient SPD was in effect a harmless error.”82   
 When the Supreme Court elected not to take the Burke appeal, it left in place 
several elements: first, an employee or plan beneficiary could present a claim based 
upon an SPD or other summary document that conflicted with the Plan itself;83 
second, the employee or plan beneficiary would be required to show prejudice;84 
third, the standard of proof for a showing of prejudice was that the employee or plan 
beneficiary was likely to have been harmed as a result of the deficient SPD (or other 
summary document);85 fourth, proof of actual harm was not required;86 fifth, reliance 
by the employee or plan beneficiary upon the SPD was unnecessary;87 but, sixth, the 
employer could defend a claim by an affirmative showing that the employee or plan 
beneficiary had not suffered actual harm, i.e., the erroneous summary plan 
description was harmless.88 
B. CIGNA v. Amara 
The Second Circuit had not yet had the opportunity to render these 
conclusions when CIGNA converted its defined-benefit retirement plan to a new 
and different “cash balance account” plan in 1998.89  Although, by 1998, it was 
reasonably clear from the various circuit court opinions that SPDs would be the 
operative documents only when there was a conflict with the terms of the Plan, it 
was unclear what a plaintiff would be required to prove in order to prevail, i.e., 
regarding reliance, prejudice, and likely or actual injury.90  It was also clear by 1998 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 See id. at 110. 
84 Id. at 111-12. 
85 Id. at 113-14. 
86 See id. 
87 Id. at 112. 
88 Id. at 113. 
89 See CIGNA Corp., v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1870 (2011). 
90 See, e.g., Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 247 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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that plan modifications did not create ERISA violations so long as the modifications 
were made in accordance with ERISA and in a timely manner.91   
 CIGNA’s plan changes did, however, create a situation in which vested 
benefits might be reduced.92  Moreover, notices of those changes, through the 
newsletter or otherwise, were untimely and erroneous.93  The Supreme Court found 
no reason to disturb the factual findings made by the district court regarding 
timeliness (or lack thereof) and employer-generated misinformation.94  The Supreme 
Court cited with approval the conclusions of the district court regarding the 
underlying facts of the case and CIGNA’s violation of ERISA Sections 102(a), 
104(b), and 204(h).95    
 The Supreme Court limited its review of the underlying case to two issues: 
first, “whether the District Court applied the correct legal standard, namely a ‘likely 
harm’ standard, in determining that CIGNA’s notice violations caused its employees 
sufficient injury to warrant legal relief,”96 and second, “whether the ERISA section . . 
. mentioned (ERISA’s recovery-of-benefits-due provision, section 502(a)(1)(B)) 
authorizes entry of the relief the District Court provided.”97  While the Supreme 
Court answered both of these questions in the negative, seemingly finding in favor of 
CIGNA, the Court offered an alternative basis for relief, namely, section 502(a)(3), 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., Wise v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 986 F.2d 929, 934 (5th Cir. 1993) (“It is undisputed that 
nothing in ERISA requires an SPD to reference amendment rights or procedures.”).  The court found 
that plan administrators are free to amend the terms of plans, even if the benefits to non-vested 
employees are diminished or deleted, so long as the administrators follow the ERISA-prescribed 
scheme for doing so, and so long as vested benefits are not touched.  Id. 
92 See CIGNA.,131 S. Ct. at 1873. 
93 Id. at 1872-73. 
94 See id. at 1871. 
95 Id. (“[T]he interested reader can find a more thorough description  [of the circumstances] in two 
District Court opinions, which set forth that court’s findings reached after a lengthy trial.” (citations 
omitted)); see also id. at 1874 (“The District Court concluded, as a matter of law, that CIGNA’s 
representations (and omissions) about the plan, made between November 1997 (when it announced 
the plan) and December 1998 (when it put the plan into effect) violated: (a) ERISA § 204(h) . . . and 
(b) ERISA §§ 102(a) and 104(b).”). 
96 Id. at 1871. 
97 Id. at 1871.  The Supreme Court, in addressing these two issues, would essentially also decide 
whether detrimental reliance is a necessary consideration. 
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and remanded the case.98  When the answer to the latter issue is linked with those 
aspects of the district court’s opinion that the Supreme Court left undisturbed, the 
Supreme Court’s decision presents a mixed bag of results for both sides to this 
dispute.  What the district court does on remand will more likely define the favored 
party. 
IV. SECTION 502(A)(3) RATHER THAN SECTION 502(A)(1)(B) IS THE 
APPROPRIATE ERISA SECTION FOR INDIVIDUALIZED EQUITABLE RELIEF 
 The district court secured relief for the CIGNA employees and plan 
beneficiaries by using section 502(a)(1)(B) to reform the Plan and then ordering the 
plan administrator (CIGNA) to provide benefits in accordance with the reformed 
plan, but the Supreme Court rejected any authority existing pursuant to section 
502(a)(1)(B) to change a plan.99  “That provision states that a ‘civil action may be 
brought’ by a plan ‘participant or beneficiary . . . to recover benefits due to him 
under the terms of his plan.’”100  However, there is nothing in that section that 
authorizes a plan reformation.101  Reformation, if possible, would need to be based 
upon some other section of ERISA.102  The Supreme Court reasoned further that the 
recovery of benefits due under a “plan” means just that; that is, the Plan and not the 
SPD contains the benefits due.103  Section 502(a)(1)(B) can be used to enforce the 
terms of the Plan but not the terms of the SPD: 
[W]e cannot agree that the terms of statutorily required plan 
summaries (or summaries of plan modifications) necessarily may be 
enforced (under § 502(a)(1)(B)) as the terms of the plan itself. . . .  
[T]he information about the plan provided by those disclosures [in 
summary plan descriptions] is not itself part of the plan.  Nothing in § 
                                                 
98 Id.; ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3) (2006). 
99 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1871, 1878. 
100 Id. at 1875-76. 
101 Id. at 1878. 
102 See Id. 
103 Id. at 1877. 
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502(a)(1)(B) (or, as far as we can tell, anywhere else) suggests the 
contrary.104   
 The district court’s award, based upon the plan as reformed, could not be 
approved if section 502(a)(1)(B) does not provide the authority for a court to reform 
a plan in the first instance.105  Without any authority found in section 502(a)(1)(B) to 
reform the plan, and concluding that the SPD (and other descriptive documents, 
such as the CIGNA newsletter) is not the Plan, the Supreme Court looked elsewhere 
for the statutory support upon which the district court might base a decision 
providing relief to the CIGNA employees and the plan beneficiaries.106  The 
Supreme Court found this support in section 502(a)(3).107  That section authorizes a 
civil action to be filed by a participant, a beneficiary, or an administrator to obtain 
other appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of ERISA or to enforce any 
provisions of a plan’s terms.108  This would include a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty.109  
The district court had not utilized section 502(a)(3) because it determined 
that a remedy for the plaintiffs could be found in section 502(a)(1)(B) and because 
the scope of section 502(a)(3) had been narrowed.110  The district court likely 
assumed that Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,111 a 1993 Supreme Court decision, precluded 
an award of compensatory damages because “categories of relief that were typically 
available in equity” are limited to such classic equitable remedies as injunction, 
                                                 
104 Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
105 Id. at 1871. 
106 Id. at 1878.  The Supreme Court’s majority opinion could have ended with the determination that 
section 501(a)(1)(B) simply does not provide the authority to provide the relief allowed by the district 
court.  As Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion, with which Justice Thomas joined, “Why the 
Court embarks on this peculiar path is beyond me.”  Id. at 1884 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia 
then refers to the majority’s section 502(a)(3) discussion as “blatant dictum.”  Id. (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
107 Id. at 1871, 1878-80. 
108 Id. at 1876. 
109 Id. at 1881. See also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 510-513 (1996). 
110 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876. 
111 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
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mandamus, or restitution.112  Compensatory damages would not be available in 
equity.113  However, in Mertens, the plan participants had brought suit against a non-
fiduciary actuary who had been involved with the plan fiduciary in that fiduciary’s 
ERISA violation.114  The plaintiffs brought suit pursuant to section 502(a)(3) to 
recover the monetary loss suffered by the plan.115  They did not base their claim 
upon section 502(a)(2) because that section was applicable to fiduciaries and not to a 
non-fiduciary such as Hewitt Associates.116   The Supreme Court, in limiting relief 
available under section 502(a)(3) to those remedies typically available in equity (thus 
not monetary damages), and further in not identifying alternative sections under 
which monetary relief might be available,117 generated years of misinterpretation, or 
at least non-understanding, of the full range of remedies available under ERISA.  
The Court in Mertens gave little direction to the lower courts in how to fashion 
equitable relief so that a reasonable interpretation of Mertens would be the non-
availability of monetary relief, rather than a roadmap of how to structure equitable 
relief.118 
Almost ten years after the Court’s decision in Mertens, the Supreme Court was 
again asked, in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,119 to identify the 
nature of equitable relief available to a plaintiff under section 502(a)(3).  In Great-
West, the plaintiff health insurance company sought reimbursement from its insured 
from an underlying personal injury lawsuit recovery.120  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, qualified the insurance company’s claim as “the kind of restitution . . . that . 
. . is not equitable,” as was claimed by Great-West.121  Relief was therefore 
                                                 
112 Id. at 256 (emphasis in original). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 250. 
115 Id. at 253. 
116 Id. at 252-53. 
117 See id. at 256-58. 
118 See id. 
119 534 U.S. 204 (2002). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. At 214. 
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unavailable as “other equitable relief” under section 502(a)(3).122  “[F]or restitution to 
lie in equity, the action generally must seek not to impose personal liability on the 
defendant, but to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the 
defendant’s possession.”123  Justice Scalia proceeded to explain this distinction 
between law and equity by reference to recognized standard texts on equity and to 
the Restatements.124  While the Court’s explanation may have been necessary in 
response to the nature of the claim brought by Great-West, Justice Scalia’s references 
to the current treatises on equity and trust law may not have created the kind of 
roadmap needed by the lower courts.   
As an example of the continuing difficulty faced by the lower courts in 
deciding whether a suit is one at law or in equity, the Second Circuit in Pereira v. 
Farace,125 in determining whether a jury trial was guaranteed by the Seventh 
Amendment, stated:  
 First, we ask “whether the action would have been deemed legal or equitable 
in 18th century England.”  Second, “we examine the remedy sought and determine 
whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”  We then “balance the two, giving greater 
weight to the latter.” . . .  After three decades of grappling with the law versus equity 
analysis, the late Justice William Brennan threw up his hands.  He had wearied of 
“rattling through dusty attics of ancient writs” and suggested that Seventh 
Amendment jurisprudence should sever its dependence on historical analogies to 
English common law as it existed in 1791.  However much we may sympathize with 
his position, Justice Brennan’s suggestion has gone unheeded, and thus, we are left to 
scour through the “dusty attics” ourselves.126  
 Notwithstanding the apparent confusion that was generated by Mertens and 
Great-West, Justice Breyer quickly distinguished those cases as being outside the realm 
of trust law and therefore being claims strictly for monetary relief.127  Justice Breyer’s 
opinion in CIGNA reiterates the distinction:  
                                                 
122 Id. at 218. 
123 Id. at 214. 
124 Id. at 213-14. 
125 413 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2005). 
126 Id. at 337-38 (citations omitted). 
127 CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct.  1866, 1878-79 (2011). 
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The case before us concerns a suit by a beneficiary against a plan 
fiduciary (whom ERISA typically treats as a trustee) about the terms 
of a plan (which ERISA typically treats as a trust).  It is the kind of 
lawsuit that, before the merger of law and equity, respondents could 
have brought only in a court of equity, not a court of law.  With the 
exception of the relief now provided by § 502(a)(1)(B), the remedies 
available to those courts of equity were traditionally considered 
equitable remedies.128  
While reformation is a recognized equitable remedy, it is not authorized by 
section 502(a)(1)(B).129  The district court, therefore, did not have the authority 
pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B) to fashion the relief it granted.130  Only section 
502(a)(3) would authorize the kind of relief made available by the district court, and 
if the district court had distinguished CIGNA from Mertens, it would likely have 
utilized this section in granting relief.131  Justice Breyer calls attention to the current 
but traditional texts in directing the lower court in determining what, if any, 
“appropriate equitable relief” might be available to plaintiffs such as those in 
CIGNA.132  While Justice Breyer did not dictate the choice of remedies, he did offer 
one specifically as a possible other equitable remedy, namely, surcharge.133  
Consequently, even though the availability of section 502(a)(3) was not presented on 
appeal to the Supreme Court in CIGNA, and even though surcharge was not 
presented as a possible form of relief by the appellants or briefed by the parties, the 
applicability of section 502(a)(3) was discussed in depth at oral argument and the 
concept of surcharge was raised by the majority.134  The majority opinion, without 
the approval of Justices Scalia and Thomas, provides clear direction to the lower 
                                                 
128 Id. at 1879 (citations omitted). 
129 See ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
130 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1878.  See generally ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006). 
131 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1882. See generally ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006); Mertens 
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
132 See CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. 1878-80. 
133 Id. at 1880. 
134 See generally id. 
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courts as to where they might find a conceptual basis for “other appropriate 
equitable relief.”135    
Justices Scalia and Thomas may have correctly characterized the majority 
opinion related to section 502(a)(3) as “blatant dictum,” but it was possibly the 
Supreme Court itself that created the circumstances that now explain and justify the 
Court’s extended reasoning in CIGNA.136  After all, the Supreme Court in 2004 
denied certiorari in Burke when the “likely harm” standard could have been 
rejected.137  Likewise, Mertens, Great-West, and numerous other cases138 presented the 
Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify once and for all (1) what kind of relief 
is available under section 502(a)(1)(B), (2) that recovery under that section is 
restricted to reimbursing the “trust,” and (3) whether section 502(a)(3) authorizes the 
“trust” and individual plan participants to secure “make-whole relief.”139  
A. Actual Harm, But Without Detrimental Reliance, is Required Under Section 502(a)(3) 
 The precedent-creating Second Circuit case since 2004 is Burke.140  That case 
set forth the standard that recovery of benefits pursuant to an ERISA-governed Plan 
requires a showing of prejudice to the employee, but such prejudice would exist, as a 
matter of law, when an SPD conflicts with the Plan.141  Prejudice would be 
                                                 
135 See id. at 1878-80. 
136 See id. at 1884. 
137 See  Kodak Ret. Income Plan v. Burke, 540 U.S. 1105 (2004). 
138 See generally Susan Harthill, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” 
Relief is Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721 (2008) (discussing Amschwand 
v. Spherion Corp., 128 S. Ct. 2995 (2008)). This article, with its analysis of Amschwand and the 
Supreme Court decisions leading up to the denial of certiorari in that case (at issue was “whether a 
participant or beneficiary in an employee welfare benefit plan is entitled to individualized monetary 
relief for losses caused by a fiduciary breach”), contains a review of trust law principles and suggests 
that the application of trust law principles to section 502(a)(3) litigation is far more complicated than 
was implied by Justice Scalia in Great-West (Justice Breyer’s opinion in CIGNA would probably also 
have been similarly referenced by Professor Harthill had it been issued by the time of publication).  Id. 
at 721.      
139 See generally ERISA §§ 502(a)(1)(B), 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(3) (2006). 
140 See generally Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
1105 (2004).   
141 Id. at 111-13. 
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demonstrated upon a showing that the employee was likely to suffer harm;142 proof 
of actual harm was not required.143  Conflicting terms of the SPD would then be 
enforced by the court.144  The CIGNA opinion changes Burke, and all other contrary 
circuit court decisions, and provides a set of guidelines as to the proof required of a 
plaintiff.145 
 The first guideline tells us that the Plan Document contains the terms of the 
Plan;146  everything else simply contains information about the Plan.147  If there is a 
conflict between the terms of the Plan and the terms of any other document that 
describes the Plan, a court should look to section 502(a)(3) to fashion a resolution of 
the dispute.148  Section 502(a)(3) is an equitable remedy provision and is interpreted 
in accordance with general principles of equity law.149  “We have interpreted the term 
‘appropriate equitable relief’ in section 502(a)(3) as referring to ‘those categories of 
relief’ that, traditionally speaking (i.e., prior to the merger of law and equity) ‘were 
typically available in equity.’”150  The Supreme Court, citing prominent equity authors 
and their works,151 concluded that detrimental reliance, while a necessary element in 
an estoppel case, “is not always necessary for other equitable remedies.”152  For 
example, contract reformation would not require detrimental reliance where a trustee 
breaches his duties to the trust.153  A court would order the trust made whole without 
regard to the question of reliance.154  But, in such an instance, the court would make 
                                                 
142 Id. at 113. 
143 See id. 
144 See Id. 
145 See generally CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011). 
146 See id. at 1877. 
147 See id. 
148 See ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) (2006); CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1878-80. 
149 See ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) (2006); CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. 1878-80. 
150 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1878 (quoting Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356 (2006)). 
151 Id. at 1881. 
152 Id.  
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
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the trust whole to the extent the trust was harmed.155  In other circumstances as well, 
equity would seem logical when it does not require making whole that which had not 
been diminished in some way.156   
Recognizing harm and calculating its extent will vary based not only upon the 
circumstances by which the harm was caused, but also upon the individuals who fell 
victim to the harm.157  The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty and uncertainty 
of enforcing the equitable powers of the court in the absence of clarity in ERISA.158  
“The relevant substantive provisions of ERISA do not set forth any particular 
standard for determining harm.  They simply require the plan administrator to write 
and to distribute written notices that are ‘sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to 
reasonably apprise’ plan participants and beneficiaries of ‘their rights and obligations 
under the plan.’”159  Plan participants and beneficiaries would, however, seemingly be 
required to prove some degree of actual harm based upon traditional standing rules:  
“To have standing, Appellants must suffer an actual harm by the loss of a legally 
protected interest; there must be a causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of; and it must be likely that the injury will be ‘redressed by a 
favorable decision’ by the court.”160  If a claimant cannot demonstrate some 
individualized harm, there must be evidence of a deprivation of a right as a result of 
a breach of fiduciary duty conferred by ERISA.161 
 While the Supreme Court has thus dispensed with the requirement of 
detrimental reliance, which many of the circuits had previously determined to be a 
requisite for successfully challenging the conflicting terms of a Plan, it has mandated 
the requirement of actual harm, rather than the lesser standard of likely harm.162  The 
opinion of the Court only briefly touches upon the basis for the conclusion that 
                                                 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 See generally id.  
159 Id. at 1881.  
160 Schultz v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
161 See Kendall  v. Employees Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2009). 
162 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1881-82. 
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there must be a showing of actual harm.163  The Court analogizes an award under 
section 502(a)(3) as a “surcharge” similar to a surcharge imposed upon a trustee 
following the trustee’s breach of trust.164  “To be sure, just as a court of equity would 
not surcharge a trustee for a nonexistent harm,  a fiduciary can be surcharged under 
§ 502(a)(3) only upon a showing of actual harm-proved (under the default rule for 
civil cases) by a preponderance of the evidence.”165  The Supreme Court thus made 
clear that claims for equitable relief under section 502(a)(3) will require proof of 
actual harm.166  
With regard to the CIGNA plan participants, the lower court will now 
analyze the specific losses to be suffered by those participants and, now 
unconstrained by the misinterpretation of the relief available under section 502(a)(3), 
will be able to identify compensatory damages and perhaps also reform the CIGNA 
Plan.  
B. Surcharge 
The Court’s introduction of this concept of “surcharge” is itself somewhat 
intriguing.  It had not been argued by the parties in their briefs, nor was it addressed 
in oral argument before the Court.167  Yet, it is this rationale for the allowance of 
equitable relief that the Court initiates before sending the case back to the lower 
court for further proceedings, presumably to decide whether a surcharge is to be 
ordered and, if so, how it is to be calculated.168  The Court looked back to its 1939 
decision in Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson169 for its offer of a “surcharge” 
as a possible equitable remedy.170  Interestingly, the Court barely touched upon the 
                                                 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 1881 (citing G. BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 861 (rev. 2d ed. 
1995)). 
165 Id. at 1881 (citation omitted). 
166 See id. at 1881-82. 
167 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011) (No. 09-
804), 2010 WL 4859511; Brief for Petitioner, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011) (No. 
09-804), 2010 WL 831182; Brief for Respondent, CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011) 
(No. 09-804), 2010 WL 500088. 
168 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1881-82. 
169 305 U.S. 456 (1939). 
170 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1880. 
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concept in that case.171  The Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court that had addressed a jurisdictional question and in so doing adopted 
the following statement:  
An accounting by fiduciaries is in itself a proceeding quasi in rem, in 
the sense that it not only adjudicates the legality of the investments 
constituting the trust, but also, if it results in a surcharge, orders 
payment and restoration of moneys to the trust fund, that is, to the 
res.  [Such] a surcharge is not a judgment to pay money to individuals 
as in an ordinary personal injury action. . . .  [I]n other words, the 
recovery would be by the trust fund and not by appellants, who can 
gain therefrom only upon distribution of the income and ultimately 
of the corpus of the trust, as prescribed in the agreement by which it 
was created.172  
Justice Breyer’s reference to “surcharge” clearly offers the possibility that an 
individual plaintiff may sue a fiduciary for monetary damages under section 502(a)(3) 
as “other appropriate equitable relief.”173  This provides clarification of what was 
previously treated as a section 502(a)(2) restoration of funds to a trust and not made 
available for individual victims of a trustee’s breach of fiduciary duties.174  Justice 
Breyer’s discussion recognizes that “[a]n action by beneficiaries for a breach of trust 
is an equitable proceeding, even if money damages are the only remedy sought.”175 
 While Justice Breyer’s reference to “surcharge” in the CIGNA opinion is 
brief, its impact may be significant.  It confirms what some commentators had 
already argued, that is, that surcharge is available to individuals as equitable relief 
under section 502(a)(3).176  Perhaps the most extensive discussion on the question of 
“surcharge” (and “make-whole” relief) is contained in Professor Harthill’s article 
reviewing the Amschwand case.177  Her review of the pertinent Restatement of Trust 
                                                 
171 See Lida, 305 U.S. at 463-64. 
172 Thompson v. Fitzgerald, 198 A. 58, 66 (Pa. 1938); aff’d by Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. 
Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939). 
173 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1876, 1878, 1880 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006)). 
174 See Id. at 1878-79. 
175 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 598 (2011). 
176 See infra notes 183-88. 
177 Harthill, supra note 138, at 723-24. 
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provisions, the Uniform Trust Code of 2000, and the leading trust treatises will 
surely inform litigants in future ERISA cases.178  She attributes much of the 
confusion in past district and circuit court decisions to the confusing literature that 
interchangeably references the concepts of surcharge, compensatory damages, 
accounting, and make-whole relief.179  While the CIGNA decision may not have 
fleshed out the elements of surcharge—after all, this was dictum—it has crystallized 
the issue for the lower courts.  As Professor Harthill stated, “It is absurd to think 
that Congress would have extended the substantive duties and obligations of a 
trustee to ERISA plan fiduciaries but at the same time limit the remedies available 
under traditional trust law to those situations where the trust corpus is harmed,”180 
and “[c]ertainly, relief for loss to the plan is payable to the plan under ERISA 
sections 409 and 502(a)(2).”181  “Relief for these types of cases would, therefore, be 
payable to the trust corpus.  But the availability of relief payable back into the trust 
corpus does not foreclose the availability of relief to the individual beneficiary, as pre-
fusion cases evidence, and which is reflected in ERISA Section 502(a)(3).”182  
V. CONCLUSION 
 If the Supreme Court’s acceptance of what was essentially CIGNA’s request 
for appeal was thought to lead to a final resolution of the issues presented in that 
litigation, and, at the same time, the resolution of the various circuit court 
approaches to SPD anomalies, the Court’s opinion and its remand to the lower court 
should dampen those thoughts.  The Court clarified that section 502(a)(1)(B) will not 
serve as the basis for individual relief in response to employer (plan administrator) 
violations of ERISA Sections 102(a) and 104(b). However, the Court has not 
clarified the applicability of section 502(a)(1)(B) to section 204(h) violations, which 
was not argued before the Supreme Court. 
 The Court has also resisted a one-size fits all mentality.  Its focus on the 
plaintiffs of this claim, and its acknowledgement of the “flexible approach” of 
                                                 
178 See id. at 754-71. 
179 Id. at 751-52. 
180 Id. at 764. 
181 Id. at 782 (emphasis removed). 
182 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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equity,183 suggests that the Court will be open to a variety of lower court decisions 
applicable only to the plaintiffs therein and ultimately not easily reviewable other 
than for abuse of discretion because they will be uniquely fact-sensitive.  Perhaps the 
next set of appeals will be just that, whether the lower court abused its discretion in 
fashioning appropriate equitable relief. 
If we examine the Court’s clear statements, together with those issues that 
the Court chose not to address and therefore left undisturbed, we should be able to 
identify some conclusions: 
1) The plan administrator must act in a timely manner.  Plans may be changed, 
assuming they do not contain prohibitions against change and so long as the changes 
do not affect vested rights, but timely notice of any changes must be given. Any 
permissible changes must be prospective, not retroactive, and explained in advance 
of the changes taking effect.  
2) The Plan is not anything other than the Plan.  All materials and 
communications about the Plan would fall under the category of SPDs.  Plan 
administrators should therefore restrict their summary plan descriptions and related 
communications to as few documents as possible, perhaps only a single SPD, and 
seek and receive pertinent compliance reviews confirming that any and all secondary 
documents and communications do not add to, or alter, plan terms, unless the 
additions and alterations are in fact desired.  Careful analysis should be made 
regarding whether any communication will result in a change of benefit and which 
employees and other plan beneficiaries will be affected by the change. 
3) The employer should resist issuing communications to employees and plan 
beneficiaries regarding the ERISA-governed Plan.  All communications should 
emanate from the plan administrator.  Internally, the employer’s human resource 
manager and the company’s general counsel should jointly review all 
communications, proposals, and explanations. Employees and plan beneficiaries, as a 
matter of course, should preserve all communications regarding their plans.  Even 
cover letters may be instrumental in establishing ERISA violations. 
4) The new “no reliance but actual harm required” standard resolves the dispute 
among the circuits that has existed since the circuit courts began reviewing such 
                                                 
183 CIGNA, 131 S. Ct. at 1881 (citing BOGERT, supra note 164, § 861) (“In such instances equity 
courts would ‘mold the relief to protect the rights of the beneficiary according to the situation 
involved.’”). 
164             TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 13 
 
 
  
issues.  Employers and plan administrators with multi-jurisdictional plans now enjoy 
a more uniform treatment of violations and remedies. 
5) Employees who do not suffer actual harm will have no reason to institute 
legal action, and there will likely be fewer situations in which class actions would be 
the appropriate form in which to bring suit.  In those cases in which classes may be 
recognized, they might in fact be smaller and more focused in the requested relief.  
Equity may call for a variety of remedies within the same class.   
6) The availability of equitable relief for individual claims based upon section 
502(a)(3) is clear, whether made through reformation, restitution, or surcharge, but 
what will be “appropriate” in given circumstances remains uncertain.  The availability 
and application of equitable remedies will be determined by trust law principles, and 
reference to the leading trust law authors will be expected. 
7) While much of the Court’s opinion consists of dicta, a reasonable expectation 
is that such dicta will be followed in trial and lower appellate courts in the future.184     
The Supreme Court itself seems to be doing equity.  First, it balanced a strict 
reading of the pertinent ERISA provisions with a generous degree of advisory 
opinion.  Second, it balanced the rights of employees to be given timely and accurate 
information against the right of an employer not to be held to account for harmless 
and unintended mistakes.  Third, it balanced the right of employees and plan 
beneficiaries to be secure in their vested benefits against the need and right of an 
employer to amend a plan.  Fourth, it balanced the right of an employer to make and 
change ERISA-governed plans in accordance with its statutory right against the 
rights of employees to make certain that the employer’s statutory rights are properly 
exercised.  Finally, it vested the lower courts with the authority to construct 
appropriate equitable remedies for violations of ERISA-governed plans, but did not 
dictate what those remedies must be.  Courts now seem to have the flexibility and 
discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief, including money damages, under 
section 502(a)(3).  What remains to be seen is whether the Supreme Court, in so 
doing, has set the stage for more litigation and the likelihood that additional 
interpretation of section 502(a)(3) will be needed.  
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